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We are here to report on the progress of the work of 
the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, to discuss some 
of the problems we have encountered, to expose our thinking on 
some critical issues, and to seek feedback that will help us in 
our work. It is now almost eighteen months since we undertook 
our study. I am sure that you are concerned, as the Commission 
is, that we complete our work as expeditiously as possible.
However, we are in the middle of an enormous and complex assign­
ment. We have spent about forty-two days in meetings of the 
full Commission and many more hours in preparation. Our goal 
is to define the role and responsibilities of independent 
auditors and to. recommend carefully developed standards by 
which their performance should be evaluated.
2I must remind you at the outset that we are not a 
standard-setting body. Our conclusions and recommendations 
will not be issued as authoritative pronouncements. Their 
authority will rest on their persuasiveness. An integral part 
of our work is to persuade other bodies to adopt and implement 
our recommendations.
Despite the absence of visible signs, we
have made significant progress in our study. The 
forty-page Statement of Issues, which we published last fall, 
indicates the scope of our study. Briefly summarize, the total 
project consists of three fundamental elements. The first is a 
group of studies intended to develop an appropriate and workable 
concept of responsibility in a number of critical areas, such as 
uncertainty, fraud, illegal acts of management and communication 
of the results of the examination including the formation of 
an opinion on financial statements--the "present fairly" issue.
A second element involves consideration of the current 
role of the auditor as it may be affected by other services, such 
as MAS and tax, and how that role might be affected by extension 
to new areas, such as forecasts. Despite the withdrawal of its 
proposal by the SEC, various pressures to engage in forecasting 
will continue.
However, no statement of auditors’ responsibilities 
will be useful unless it is within the capacity of the 
auditor and it is consistent with the reasonable expec­
tations of users. Therefore, the third element of our study 
is a comparison of the "resource inventory" of the auditor— 
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e.g., his education., useful auditing standards and procedures, the 
professional climate and regulatory structure within which he 
works —with a reasonable conception of his responsibilities.
In addressing those issues, we have been probing such 
fundamental questions as:
• What function do independent auditors 
perform when they express opinions on 
financial statements?
• How closely is the auditor’s function 
tied to the financial information with 
which he is associated? For example, 
does an annual audit involve a respon­
sibility limited to the financial state­
ments or is there some continuous 
responsibility not limited to particular 
financial statements?
• To what extent does the auditor have a 
whistle-blowing obligation?
• Should the auditing profession be viewed
as a single, unitary one or a tiered 
profession with two or more layers that 
involve different types of practice?
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Another fundamental question relates to the procedural 
direction we are following. Are we devoting too much time to 
issues under study by the Institute’s auditing standards 
executive committee or the Securities and Exchange Commission? 
We think not. Our perspective is different from that of the 
auditing standards committee or the SEC. We are considering all 
of the issues in a broad integrated framework. Our objective is 
to articulate a coherent, consistent, and useful position on the 
sensitive issues that shape the concept and understanding of the 
role and responsibilities of independent auditors.
Let me review where we stand today on some of those 
issues. I emphasize that these "stands” are tentative positions 
that will continue to evolve as we receive more evidence 
from our own research and more feedback from individuals and 
groups such as this. I urge you to use the simultaneous 
sessions that follow to comment on the specific points
I will make in the next few minutes.
We recognize that our conclusions on each issue must 
be consistent with a realistic conception of the independent 
auditor's role in society. Basic to our study is the 
conclusion that the essential role of the independent 
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auditor and the need for the function he performs lie in the 
contribution he can make to the credibility of the 
financial information so essential to the public’s overall 
confidence in financial markets. Consequently, we believe 
that a broader examination of the auditor's role with respect to finan­
cial information beyond formal financial statements is necessary 
for a reasonable evaluation of demands for and possible exten­
sions of the auditor’s traditional role.
On a more specific levels we are attempting to resolve 
the persistent confusion that has surrounded the use of the term 
’’present fairly.” The result of that work—at least to date—is 
in the paper "Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations," 
that was distributed to you before this meeting. This paper, 
tentative though it is, "fairly presents" the direction of the 
thinking of the Commission at this point, the level at which we 
are examining the issues, and the type of conclusions being 
developed.
Widespread misunderstanding of the term "present fairly" 
has contributed to the expectation gap confronting auditors. 
Judge MacMahon’s observation in the Herzfeld case that the 
courts are appropriately concerned with "whether the report
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fairly presents the true financial position..to the untutored 
eye of an ordinary investor," is evidence of the confusion.
In addressing the issue, we have not continued the debate 
about what "present fairly" means to all who read that phrase. 
Instead, we have attempted to state more precisely the nature 
of the judgments and decisions required in forming an opinion 
on financial statements. A better understanding of the role of 
judgment in the application of generally accepted accounting 
principles and a strengthening of generally accepted auditing 
standards to provide independent auditors with improved guides 
to apply judgment should minimize if not eliminate much of the 
debate and confusion. We would impose greater and more explicit 
responsibility on the auditor for judging the appropriateness 
of the accounting principles selected and provide him with more 
explicit guidance for making that evaluation. We would require 
auditors to stand back and evaluate the appropriateness of the 
overall effect of the accounting principles selected and the 
overall effect of the individual decisions made.
We believe it necessary to strengthen the message 
that the financial statements are the representations of 
management. Thus, we have tentatively concluded that, when a 
company faces unusual uncertainties, the financial 
statements and related disclosures should bear the burden 
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of highlighting those uncertainties and that the "subject 
to” opinion should be eliminated. A strategically placed note 
to the financial statements describing the uncertainty and dis­
closing the possible material adverse effect of an unfavorable 
outcome would be far more desirable than the often misunderstood 
and usually redundant ’’subject to” opinion. This is consistent 
with our view that management should assume a greater affirmative 
obligation of analysis and interpretation of the financial state­
ments and related disclosures.
In another area, we are attempting to clarify the auditor's 
responsibility for the detection of management fraud. In an audit 
of financial statements, an independent auditor is concerned with 
the adequacy of controls and other measures designed to prevent 
fraud. Auditing standards should clearly state that 
he has an affirmative duty to look for fraud. However he should 
not always be held liable for failure to find it. Instead, his 
performance ought to be evaluated on the basis of the extent to 
which he exercises professional skill and care commensurate with 
a reasonable estimate of the costs and benefits of the audit 
function. The exercise of professional skill and care is the 
touchstone. The elements that constitute the exercise of pro­
fessional skill and care ought to be identified and adopted as 
a part of auditing standards. We are attempting to identify the 
substance of those elements.
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We have wrestled with two issues without yet developing 
a consensus. The first concerns the auditor’s responsibility 
for the detection and disclosure of illegal and improper acts 
of management. That issue is perhaps the hottest topic around 
today if not necessarily the most important in the long run. 
In January, Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the Joint 
Congressional Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Govern­
ment, in an exchange with SEC Chairman Roderick Hills, seemed 
to imply that the auditor should have the responsibility not 
only for disclosing such payments but also of uncovering them. 
Of course, we recognize that the independent auditor’s respon­
sibility for illegal payments that have a material effect on the 
financial statements is the same as his responsibility for the 
detection of management fraud. His performance should be governed 
by the standard of professional skill and care appropriate to 
fraud. Beyond that, the issue becomes very murky. One 
thing seems clear to us: The responsibility for disclosing 
known illegal or improper acts is different, and should be 
considered separately from responsibility the independent 
auditor may have for detecting such behavior.
I have been closely involved as legal counsel in several 
of the leading cases in this area. I know how delicate and 
sensitive the question of the independent auditor’s responsibility 
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is. There are few guidelines. Confusing signals appear to 
emanate from the Securities and Exchange Commission. Some 
guidelines have been promised by the SEC. However, until useful 
guidelines are developed, the best that we can hope to do is to 
lay out some possible alternatives for defining the auditor’s 
responsibility consistent with our conception of his role. At 
this stage, we have no clear-cut solution. The questions are 
perplexing. What role should materiality play? How should it 
be defined? To whom should a disclosure responsibility run?
 
What would be the impact on the auditor-client relationship?
The stakes are high. We cannot simply wait for the 
regulatory bodies to set guidelines. We must speak forcefully 
to this issue and help to shape the evolving role of the 
independent auditor in this area from a perspective broader 
than merely the currently fashionable concern for illegal 
campaign contributions and foreign bribes.
The second issue, with which we are still struggling, con­
cerns the communication actually provided in auditor’s reports. 
Evidence abounds that the standard report is misunderstood. 
Recent surveys indicate that many investors do not bother to 
read the auditor's report and that those who do read it do not 
understand the premises on which it is based and the nature and limi­
tations of the conclusions intended to be conveyed. More disturbing 
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is the evidence from these surveys and other sources that many 
investors view the report as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval." 
We have concluded that ways must be found to communicate 
better to those who rely on the work of independent auditors.
We are considering alternative ways of doing this that are not 
limited to small revisions in the language in the auditor's 
report. We have reached a consensus to recommend that a report 
by the chief financial officer be included with the auditor's 
report to reinforce the message that the financial statements 
are the representations of management and to explain more pre­
cisely the role of the independent auditor in their presentation. 
Moreover, we are looking at the issue of communication not merely 
in terms of the traditional standard report but also in terms of 
other possible reports on other financial information. We plan 
to expose our views on possible alternatives and to elicit 
comment and criticism at public hearings.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that we are not com­
partmentalizing issues. Our conclusions on each issue must be 
tested against our conclusions on other issues.
We have a broad range of interrelated issues and are 
conducting research to develop evidence that will be useful in 
our deliberations on those issues. Indeed, our research effort 
is the core of our study.
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Three of our research projects are designed to help us 
identify problem areas in practice and to determine what can be 
done. The first is a broad survey and analysis 
of legal and other cases involving alleged audit failures. This 
is basic to the entire project and involves a large manpower 
commitment. The staff is compiling a data bank of significant 
cases in the last ten years.
The second project is a questionnaire survey of 
current and former staff auditors. The sample was 
selected from the membership of the Institute. The survey is 
designed to study the effects of selected aspects of auditors' 
work environment, such as time-budget pressures, on their behavior 
and performance.
The third project in this category consists of interviews 
of technical partners and legal counsel of audit firms by members 
of the Commission and senior members of the Commission's staff. 
The interviews are arranged to allow those on the firing line 
to discuss with us in confidence some of the problems they have 
encountered in their experience.
In other areas, we are involved with two questionnaire 
surveys. The first queries analysts and investors on the sig­
nificance to them of disclosures in financial statements 
concerning illegal and other improper acts of management.
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It focuses on acts whose effects are not material in traditional 
financial statement terms. The purpose is to determine whether 
analysts and investors consider such information significant 
for their investment decisions.
The second survey, conducted by researchers at the 
University of Illinois, concerns communication in the auditor's 
standard report. We hope to obtain from the study more infor­
mation on users' understanding of the auditor's standard report 
in its present form.
In another area, we are sponsoring a
symposium on the implications of the growing body
of literature and empirical evidence that seem to suggest that 
the present scheme of financial reporting has very little impact 
on the functioning of capital markets. Several leading authorities 
have been invited to discuss the problem for our benefit.
We are ever mindful of the need to consider the incre­
mental costs and benefits of any changes that we may recommend. 
For that reason, we have commissioned a study to develop a con­
ceptual model for analyzing the cost-benefit relationships of 
the audit function.
In addition, our staff and consultants have prepared 
background papers on all of the issues on which we are reaching 
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tentative conclusions. Additional papers are in preparation.
They include papers on:
1. New forms of reporting.
2. Regulation of the auditing profession.
3. Education and training of auditors.
4. The relationship between the auditor and
parties interested in the audit function.
5. The auditor’s legal environment.
It would serve no purpose here to repeat the issues in 
our Statement of Issues. You are aware that they run the gamut 
of problems significant to independent auditors. We are con­
sidering the whole broad structure by which independent auditors 
are trained, regulated, and disciplined. We are looking at the 
structure of the profession from the broadest possible perspective. 
We are not ignoring the problems of any segment of the profession.
In probing the question whether more explicit recog­
nition should be given to the multi-tiered character of the 
profession, we are giving special attention to the problems of 
sole practitioners and firms with several rather than hundreds 
of partners.
As might be expected with a project of this complexity, 
there has been a considerable start-up period. Lee Seidler, now 
serving as deputy chairman of the Commission, has assumed principal 
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responsibility for day-to-day policy implementation
Of Commission activities. Doug Carmichael, who recently became 
the managing director of the technical divisions of the Institute, 
devotes substantial time to directing the Commission’s staff.
Each member of the Commission works closely with assigned 
staff on specific projects.
As We completed the clarification of the issues facing 
the Commission, it became clear that the amount of skilled, exper­
ienced person power resources necessary for the effective com­
pletion of our task would be far greater than was originally 
contemplated.
Three months ago, we began to seek the needed additional 
assistance. The critical need is for experienced audit personnel 
who can apply that experience to the work of the Commission. 
We asked the major accounting firms to provide such personnel 
to the Commission, by lending us several managers for an 
extended period.
Unfortunately, we have not been successful in obtaining 
the necessary manpower. Two firms, Arthur Young and Coopers 
& Lybrand, responded quickly and effectively. A highly competent 
person from each firm is now working full time with the 
Commission. One of them, Bob Temkin of Arthur Young, will be 
at one of the simultaneous sessions. Another firm, Peat, Marwick, 
has identified a staff member who will start with the Commission 
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shortly. Haskins & Sells is not only supplying Ken Stringer 
as a member of the Commission, but has identified two managers 
who will join our staff.
But, our needs are far greater. I regret to say that 
no other firms have yet found themselves able to identify and 
provide the resources we require. I cannot exaggerate the 
seriousness of the problem and its potential impact on our 
ultimate possibility of success or failure.
The Commission has been operating for 18 months and 
has achieved, as I have noted, a good deal of success if only 
in educating its chairman. A great deal of work remains.
After a careful review of all the remaining issues 
and projects., and some paring of the scope of our work., we 
estimate that an absolute minimum of 700 man weeks will be 
needed to complete our task. At our current staff levels 
reflecting all the new assistance I have just mentioned, at 
most, less than 400 man weeks are available to us. Simple 
arithmetic suggests that almost two years of work remain.
Two more years is an unacceptable period.
First, and most important, our report is needed by
the profession, and in less than two years from now.
Although we are constantly attempting to view our work 
in a long-term perspective, if the Commission’s total life 
were to run to almost four years, we would undoubtedly find 
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that the rapid pace of change would condemn us to update 
continually much of our earlier work.... suggesting a never 
ending task. Even today, the intensified activities of 
AudSEC, which we applaud., force us to update constantly 
those portions of our report that purport to describe the 
"current” state of the art.
Third., three of the staff members made available to 
us by the firms will be on loan for only one year, and it would 
be unfair, in terms of their own careers, to expect them to 
leave their regular work for a longer period.
Lastly, some consideration must be given to the 
Commission members. Their initial agreement to serve on the 
Commission was predicated on estimates that the task would 
require no more than a year and half. We have already exceeded 
that figure.
Every member of the Commission continues to hold his 
regular position of major responsibility., in addition to his 
work on the Commission. Every member has made a considerable 
personal sacrifice to serve on the Commission, and every 
member is willing to continue to do so.... for a reasonable 
period of time. However, it is unfair for the accounting 
profession to expect a time commitment of more than three times 
that which was originally contemplated.... and it is even more 
unfair to expect such a commitment in the absence of a vitally 
necessary contribution from the profession.
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If we are to finish our task, not many years from now, 
but within the maximum feasible time period of one more year, 
we need at least 300 man weeks—6 experienced, competent staff 
members—drawn from the ranks of the profession.
In a profession of well over 100 thousand members, where 
some firms have more than 10 thousand professional staff, where 
some annual audits require the equivalent of more than 50 man 
years, I cannot believe that our requirements are unreasonable.
If the work of the Commission is truly important to 
the profession, if the sacrifices of the Commission members are 
to be Justified, the profession must stand up and be counted 
by providing the assistance we so vitally need.
Inhere do we go from here? As I have tried to indicate, 
we have made a great deal of progress so far. Further progress 
is largely up to you, the leaders of the American accounting 
profession.
Assuming that we do receive the assistance we require, 
we will continue our progress towards conclusions on many of 
the issues. We expect to publish soon the first of a series 
of discussion documents and schedule public hearings. After 
the public hearings have been conducted and all of the evidence 
is in, we will proceed to complete our deliberations and 
prepare our final report.
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From you, we ask interest, cooperation, evaluation
and frank criticism. There will be a member of the Commission 
and its staff in each of the concurrent sessions. You have 
had a chance to read one of our tentative papers and to hear 
our report. Now, I urge you to speak to us critically and 
constructively in the concurrent sessions that follow,
Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
May 1976
